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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges NYGAARD, ROTH, 
BARRY, AMBRO and FUENTES join: 
 
The Pennsylvania Pharmacists' Association1  and 16 
pharmacies operating in southeastern Pennsylvania 
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 against Feather 
O. Houstoun, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department 
of Public Welfare (the "Department"), to challenge the 
reimbursement rates paid to pharmacies under 
Pennsylvania's Medicaid program. The plaintiffs claimed 
that the Department, in administering its HealthChoices 
Southeast program ("HealthChoices"), was violating 
provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act (the 
"Medicaid Act"), 42 U.S.C. SS 1396a(a)- 1396v. The 
plaintiffs' principal claim was based on 42 U.S.C. 
S 1396a(30)(A) ("Section 30(A)"). In accordance with its 
interpretation of prior circuit precedent, the District Court 
held that the plaintiffs could assert their Section 30(A) 
claim under S 1983, but the District Court nevertheless 
granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs. We now 
hold that the plaintiffs, as Medicaid providers, may not 
assert their claims under S 1983, and we therefore affirm 
the order of the District Court on this alternative ground. 
 
I. 
 
Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program under 
which the federal government furnishes funding to states 
for the purpose of providing medical assistance to eligible 
low-income persons. See 42 U.S.C. S 1396; Rite Aid of 
Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 
1999). If a state chooses to participate in the program, it 
must comply with the Medicaid Act and implementing 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services ("HHS"). See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Pennsylvania Pharmacists' Association is a non-profit corporation 
representing over 440 independent pharmacies and over 1,000 
pharmacists employed at these pharmacies. 
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Ass'n., 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990). In order to participate, a 
state must submit a medical assistance plan to the 
Secretary of HHS and obtain approval of the plan. See 42 
U.S.C. S 1396; 42 C.F.R. S 430.10 (2001). With further 
administrative approval, a state may amend a previously 
approved plan. See 42 C.F.R. S 430.12 (2001). 
 
Under the Medicaid Act, a state is required to pay for 
certain enumerated services and may choose to pay for 
certain additional services. 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(10)(A); 42 
C.F.R. S 440.210 (2001). Pennsylvania includes prescription 
drugs among its optional services. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 1396d(a)(12); 42 C.F.R. S 440.120(a) (2001). 
 
Until 1997, Pennsylvania compensated participating 
pharmacists directly under a "fee-for-service" program. 
Payments to these pharmacies generally consisted of two 
components: (1) ingredient cost reimbursement and (2) a 
dispensing fee. Pharmacies were compensated for brand- 
name drugs based on the "estimated acquisition cost" of the 
drugs2 plus a "reasonable" dispensing fee. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 1396(a)(30)(A); 42 C.F.R. S 447.300 et seq. Pharmacists 
were compensated for generic drugs using acquisition cost 
limits established by HHS plus a reasonable dispensing fee. 
 
In 1997, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare 
began to implement its HealthChoices program, a 
mandatory managed care program operated in five counties 
in the southeastern part of the state pursuant to an HFCA 
waiver from certain provisions of the Medicaid Act. 3 The 
Department contracted with four health management 
organizations ("HMOs") to administer HealthChoices. Three 
of the four HMOs administer pharmacy benefits through 
contracts with pharmacy benefits managers. When an HMO 
contracts with a pharmacy benefits manager, the HMO and 
the pharmacy benefits manager set the rates at which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The "estimated acquisition cost" is the"agency's best estimate of the 
price generally and currently paid by providers for a drug marketed or 
sold by a particular manufacturer or labeler in the package size of drug 
most frequently purchased by providers." 42 C.F.R. S 447.301 (2001). 
 
3. The waiver applies to 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(1)(statewide scope), 
S 1396a(a)(10)(B)(comparability of services), and S 1396a(a)(23)(freedom 
of 
choice). 
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pharmacies are reimbursed. The pharmacy benefits 
manager then contracts directly with the participating 
pharmacies to provide outpatient pharmacy services to 
eligible beneficiaries. 
 
In order to participate in HealthChoices, the named 
pharmacy plaintiffs entered into standardized Medical 
Assistance Provider Agreements with the Department. The 
Agreements cover the provision of brand-name and generic 
prescription drugs to eligible beneficiaries and obligate the 
Department to reimburse the contracting pharmacies in 
accordance with state and federal law. 
 
In January 1999, the plaintiffs commenced this action in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and requested declaratory and injunctive 
relief. The plaintiffs' principal claim was that the new 
payment rates violate Section 30(A), which requires a state 
Medicaid plan to assure that payments "are consistent with 
efficiency, economy, and quality of care" and"are sufficient 
to enlist enough providers so that care and services are 
available under the plan at least to the extent that such 
care and services are available to the general population in 
the geographic area." The plaintiffs alleged that the 
pharmacy benefits managers, without oversight from the 
Department, had decreased the outpatient pharmacy 
benefit rates so much that they were below the cost of 
acquiring and dispensing the drugs. 
 
The District Court certified a class of pharmacy plaintiffs 
and denied the Department's motion to dismiss the 
complaint, holding that the plaintiffs had "a private right to 
enforce [Section 30(A)]." Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n v. 
Houstoun, No. CIV.A. 99-491 (E.D. Pa. October 21, 1999). 
As support for its holding on this point, the Court cited a 
footnote in a prior panel opinion of this Court. See Rite Aid 
of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 850 n. 7 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
 
The District Court subsequently granted the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. Pennsylvania Pharmacists 
Ass'n v. Houstoun, No. CIV.A. 99-491, 2000 WL 730344, at 
* 1 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2000). The Court held that the 
Department, in implementing its new program, had 
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properly considered efficiency, economy, and access to 
quality pharmacy services, that its procedures were neither 
arbitrary nor capricious, and that the resulting payment 
rates did not violate Section 30(A). Pennsylvania 
Pharmacists Ass'n, 2000 WL 730344, at * 3-5. 
 
The Plaintiffs appealed, and their arguments were heard 
before a regular panel. Under a longstanding practice of our 
Court, a panel may not overrule another panel decision. A 
footnote in the panel opinion in Rite Aid appeared to hold 
that a provider may assert a Section 30(A) claim under 
S 1983, but the footnote provided no elaboration.4 By the 
time of the panel argument in this case, the other courts of 
appeals were divided on this issue. Prior to the issuance of 
a panel decision, we granted rehearing en banc primarily 
for the purpose of considering the S 1983 issue. 
 
II. 
 
The threshold issue that we must consider is whether the 
plaintiffs, as Medicaid providers (as opposed to Medicaid 
recipients), may assert a Section 30(A) claim under 28 
U.S.C. S 1983. Section 1983 provides a private right of 
action against any person who, acting under the color of 
state or territorial law, abridges "rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the 
United States. See also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 
(1980). In order to seek redress under S 1983, a plaintiff 
"must assert the violation of a federal right," and not merely 
a violation of federal law. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City 
of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). Thus, a plaintiff 
alleging a violation of a federal statute may not proceed 
under S 1983 unless 1) the statute creates"enforceable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Rite Aid panel wrote as follows in footnote 7 of the opinion: 
 
       The Department argues at least in part that Rite Aid and the PPA 
       [Pennsylvania Pharmacists Association] may not sue to enforce 
       [certain] Medicaid regulations as section 30(A) "does not support a 
       private cause of action." Brief at 27. The district court rejected 
this 
       argument and we agree with this result. Rite Aid , 998 F. Supp. at 
       525-26. 
 
171 F.3d at 850. 
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rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of 
S 1983" and 2) Congress has not "foreclosed such 
enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself." Wright 
v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 
418, 423 (1987). 
 
In considering the first of these requirements -- that the 
statute must create an enforceable right, privilege, or 
immunity -- we must determine whether the three 
conditions identified by the Supreme Court in Wilder and 
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), are satisfied. 
First, the provision in question must have been"intend[ed] 
to benefit the putative plaintiff." Wilder , 496 U.S. at 509 
(quoting Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 
106)(brackets added in Wilder); see also Blessing, 520 U.S. 
at 340. Second, the right allegedly protected by the statute 
must not be so "vague and amorphous" that its 
enforcement would strain judicial competence. Blessing, 
520 U.S. at 340-41; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509. Finally, the 
statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation 
on the states, id., and thus the provision giving rise to the 
asserted right must be couched in "mandatory, rather than 
precatory, terms." Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341. 
 
Once these requirements are satisfied -- and the 
existence of a federal right is established -- a rebuttable 
presumption arises that the right is enforceable under 
S 1983. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341. This presumption may 
be rebutted by showing that Congress expressly or 
impliedly foreclosed an action under S 1983. Id.; see also 
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994). 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
In the present case, the focus of our inquiry is the 
requirement that the provision in question must have been 
intended to benefit the plaintiffs. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340; 
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509; Golden State Transit Corp., 493 
U.S. at 106; Wright, 479 U.S. at 430. It is important to keep 
in mind that the question whether a statute is intended to 
benefit particular plaintiffs is quite different from the 
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question whether the statute in fact benefits  those plaintiffs5 
or even whether Congress knew that the statute would 
benefit those plaintiffs. In the present case, it may well be 
that Section 30(A) in fact benefits pharmacies in some 
states and that Congress realized this in enacting that 
provision. For example, if Section 30(A) were not on the 
books, a state plan might provide lesser access to 
pharmacy services than Section 30(A) requires. In any such 
state, Section 30(A) presumably has the effect of increasing 
drug sales, and these increased drug sales presumably 
benefit pharmacies -- as well as drug wholesalers, drug 
manufacturers, many other businesses (e.g., lessors of 
pharmacy premises, cleaning service firms retained by 
pharmacies, trash collection companies retained by 
pharmacies, private security firms retained by pharmacies), 
employees of all of these businesses, etc. Congress 
undoubtedly realizes that federal subsidies have such ripple 
effects, but it would be outlandish to argue that the 
Wilder/Blessing intended-to-benefit requirement permits all 
of these businesses and individuals to assert Section 30(A) 
claims in federal court. Our inquiry, consequently, is quite 
narrow: did Congress, in enacting Section 30(A), intend to 
benefit providers? 
 
In attempting to answer this question, the Supreme 
Court has instructed us to pay careful attention to the way 
in which the statutory provision at issue is framed. In 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979), 
the Court wrote that the question whether a statute is 
enacted for the benefit of a particular class of plaintiffs "is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. If the intended-to-benefit requirement could be satisfied simply by 
showing that a plaintiff in fact benefits from the law in question, the 
requirement would be superfluous. No plaintiff may assert a claim in 
federal court without establishing Article III standing, and this demands, 
among other things, that the plaintiff demonstrate"injury in fact." See, 
e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A 
plaintiff 
asserting a claim based on an alleged violation of a federal law cannot 
demonstrate injury in fact unless proper enforcement of the law would 
benefit the plaintiff. Therefore, if the intended-to-benefit requirement 
could be met simply by showing that the plaintiff would benefit by 
proper enforcement, that requirement would add nothing to the injury- 
in-fact test. 
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answered by looking to the language of the statute itself." 
The Court noted the importance of any "right- or duty- 
creating language" in the statute. Id. at 690 n.13. Moreover, 
in holding that the statute in that case was intended to 
benefit the plaintiffs, the Court observed that the statute 
was "phrased in terms of the persons benefited" and was 
"draft[ed] . . . with an unmistakable focus on the benefited 
class." Id. at 691, 692 n.13. More recently, in Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 1520 (2001), the Court again 
commented on the importance of the particular phrasing of 
a statute in this regard. 
 
While Cannon and Alexander concerned the implication 
of a private right of action under a statute, rather than the 
assertion of a statutory claim under S 1983, the tests 
applied in these contexts partially overlap,6 and both tests 
ask whether the statute at issue was intended to benefit the 
putative plaintiff or plaintiffs. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 432- 
33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Thus, in cases applying the 
Wilder/Blessing test, the Court has also relied on the terms 
in which the statute is drafted. 
 
Wilder itself is illustrative. In Wilder , a hospital filed a 
S 1983 action asserting a violation of the now-repealed 
Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 
S 1396a(a)(13) (1994) (repealed 1997). The Boren 
Amendment required a state Medicaid plan to provide a 
class of providers7 with payments that were "reasonable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In determining whether a statute creates an implied right of action, 
the Supreme Court uses the four-part test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 
(1975), to determine whether Congress intended to create a private 
remedy. Under this test, the Court considers (1) whether the plaintiff is 
within the class " `for whose especial benefit' the statute was enacted," 
(2) whether "there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or 
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one," (3) whether a 
private remedy would be "consistent with the underlying purposes of the 
legislative scheme," and (4) whether "the cause of action [is] one 
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of 
the States." Id. at 78 (citations omitted). A S 1983 plaintiff need not 
prove 
that Congress specifically intended that a particular statutory right be 
enforceable under S 1983 but instead need only meet the three-part test 
outlined above. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 n. 9. 
 
7. Namely, hospitals and nursing and intermediate care facilities. See 
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 502 n.2. 
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and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by 
efficiently and economically operated facilities" that comply 
with applicable state and federal laws and standards. Id. 
Holding that there was "little doubt" that the Boren 
Amendment was intended to benefit these providers, the 
Supreme Court stressed the Boren Amendment's cost- 
reimbursement language, 496 U.S. at 503, and noted that 
the Amendment "establishe[d] a system for reimbursement 
of providers and [was] phrased in terms benefitting health 
care providers." Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Court relied on language in the Boren 
Amendment that measured the adequacy of payments in 
relation to the economics of providers, i.e., their need to 
cover their reasonable costs. As the Court later emphasized 
in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992), Wilder "took 
pains to analyze the statutory provisions in detail." 
 
B. 
 
With these standards in mind, we focus on the language 
of Section 30(A). Section 30(A) provides that a state plan for 
medical assistance must: 
 
       [P]rovide such methods and procedures relating to the 
       utilization of, and the payment for, care and services 
       available under the plan . . . as may be necessary to 
       safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care 
       and services and to assure that payments are 
       consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care 
       and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that 
       care and services are available under the plan at least 
       to the extent that such care and services are available 
       to the general population in the geographic area. 
 
Because this language is -- to put it mildly-- complex, it 
is helpful to break it down. Under Section 30(A), a state 
must provide "methods and procedures." These"methods 
and procedures" must assure that payments to providers 
produce four outcomes: (1) "efficiency," (2)"economy," (3) 
"quality of care," and (4) adequate access to providers by 
Medicaid beneficiaries.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We use the phrase "adequate access" simply as shorthand for the 
statutory requirement that providers be "available under the plan at 
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It seems clear to us that the first two required outcomes 
-- "efficiency" and "economy" -- relate to the state program, 
not providers, i.e., Section 30(A) requires that a state 
program set payments at levels that make the program 
efficient and economical.9 What sort of payments would 
make a program inefficient and uneconomical? Payments 
that are too high. Accordingly, the directive to achieve 
"efficiency" and "economy" was obviously not intended to 
benefit providers. 
 
That leaves the directives to provide "quality of care" and 
adequate access. These directives are "draft[ed] . . . with an 
unmistakable focus on" Medicaid beneficiaries, not 
providers. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691. They are"phrased in 
terms benefiting" Medicaid recipients, Wilder , 496 U.S. at 
510, and these are the persons that Congress intended to 
benefit. If Congress had wanted to look after pharmacies, it 
would hardly have framed Section 30(A) in the terms it 
chose. 
 
The language of Section 30(A) contrasts sharply with that 
of the Boren Amendment, which was interpreted in Wilder 
as intended to benefit the relevant providers. As previously 
noted, the Boren Amendment required a state Medicaid 
plan to provide payments to providers that were 
"reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be 
incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities" 
that comply with applicable state and federal laws and 
standards. Pub. L. No. 96-499, S 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 
(1980). It was thus "phrased in terms benefitting" providers 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
least to the extent that such care and services are available to the 
general population in the geographic area." We do not suggest that 
"adequate access" in the lay sense of the term will or will not meet this 
statutory requirement. 
 
9. Although the plaintiffs argue that these terms refer to the operation 
of 
pharmacies, this does not make sense. Suppose payments to pharmacies 
were set far above cost. That would not make them inefficient or 
uneconomical, i.e., "wasteful." Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary (1971). It would simply make them very profitable. 
Conversely, suppose payments to pharmacies were set well below costs. 
That also would not make them inefficient or uneconomical. It would 
simply make participation in the Medicaid program unprofitable and 
might lead them to withdraw. 
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and measured the sufficiency of payments by reference to 
the economics of providers. It plainly manifested concern 
for the economic well-being of providers. Section 30(A), 
unlike the Boren Amendment, does not demand that 
payments be set at levels that are sufficient to cover 
provider costs. Unlike the Boren Amendment, it evinces no 
direct concern for the economic situation of providers. 
Instead, it demands that payments be set at levels that are 
sufficient to meet recipients' needs. It is "phrased in terms 
benefitting" recipients, and the adequacy of payments is 
measured in relation to the health needs of recipients. It 
manifests concern solely for the well-being of recipients. It 
is therefore apparent from the statutory language that the 
intended beneficiaries of Section 30(A) are recipients, not 
providers. 
 
The principal dissent disagrees with this analysis and 
maintains that the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A) 
"confer nearly identical rights on providers." Principal 
Dissent at 23. The principal dissent makes two principal 
points. First, it dismisses the significance of the presence in 
the Boren Amendment and the absence from Section 30(A) 
of language focusing on provider costs. Second, it argues 
that quality of care played essentially the same role in the 
Boren Amendment as it does in Section 30(A). Neither point 
is well taken. 
 
The language in the Boren Amendment focusing on 
provider costs is telling because it manifests a clear 
congressional concern for the economic plight of providers 
and an intent to benefit them. We are convinced that this 
statutory language was the basis for the Wilder  Court's 
statement that the Boren Amendment was "phrased in 
terms benefitting" providers. 496 U.S. at 510. The principal 
dissent interprets this statement to mean simply that the 
Boren Amendment "required states to establish a scheme 
for provider reimbursement." See Principal Dissent at 24. 
But if this interpretation were correct, the Supreme Court's 
full sentence ("The provision establishes a system for 
reimbursement of providers and is phrased in terms 
benefitting health care providers") would say exactly the 
same thing twice ("The provision establishes a system for 
reimbursement of providers," 496 U.S. at 510, and 
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"require[s] states to establish a scheme for provider 
reimbursement," Principal Dissent at 23). We therefore 
disagree with the principal dissent and believe that the 
reference to phrasing pertains to the Boren Amendment's 
cost-reimbursement language. 
 
This cost-reimbursement language is also of particular 
significance in, to use the principal dissent's phrase, "the 
dynamic of the real world of healthcare."10 Principal Dissent 
at 24. Cost reimbursement schemes11 are generally 
favorable to providers and greatly disliked by those required 
to do the reimbursing.12 The House Committee Report 
recommending repeal of the Boren Amendment cited a 
Congressional Budget Office estimate that its elimination 
would save $1.2 billion over four years,13  and the National 
Governors Association provided even higher estimates.14 We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In its description of the "real world""context" of this case, the 
principal dissent (at 24, 25-26) summarizes the plaintiffs' (but not the 
defendant's) evidence about the effect of the new rates on access to 
pharmacies. But (1) the plaintiffs' position is disputed, (2) the District 
Court, which reached the merits of the access issue, held that the 
plaintiffs had not adduced sufficient evidence to show that the access 
requirement was not being met, Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n, 2000 
WL 730344, at * 6-8, and (3) the principal dissent does not purport to 
have examined or to reach the merits of this issue. We express no view 
whatsoever on the merits of this question. 
 
11. Before the Boren Amendment, states, as a practical matter, tended to 
pay for "the actual costs incurred by hospitals in providing care to 
Medicaid recipients, regardless of disparities in costs or efficiencies 
among hospitals." New Jersey Hosp. Ass'n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509, 
511 (3d Cir. 1995). The Boren Amendment replaced this actual-cost- 
reimbursement scheme with a reasonable-cost-reimbursement scheme. 
See id. at 514-15. 
 
12. The National Governors Association unanimously recommended 
repeal of the Boren Amendment. See 1997 WL 8219815 (March 11, 
1997) (Testimony of Govs. Miller and Leavitt before Sen. Fin. Comm.); 
1996 WL 7135617 (Feb. 21, 1996)(Statement of Govs. Thompson, Miller, 
Chiles, Engler, Leavitt, and Romer before House Commerce Comm.)("The 
Boren amendment and other Boren-like statutory provisions must be 
repealed. `One hundred percent reasonable cost reimbursement' must be 
phased out . . . ."). 
13. H.R. Rep. 149, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 547 (1997). 
 
14. See 1997 WL 8219815 (March 11, 1997) (Testimony of Govs. Miller 
and Leavitt before Sen. Fin. Comm.). 
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take no side in the policy debate about cost reimbursement, 
but we think that it is highly unrealistic to minimize the 
significance of the presence in the Boren Amendment of 
cost-reimbursement language. This language was plainly a 
boon for providers, Congress surely understood its 
implications, and its inclusion in the Boren Amendment 
was an unmistakable sign of a congressional desire to 
benefit providers. 
 
The principal dissent also misinterprets the Boren 
Amendment as containing a quality-of-care requirement 
similar to that in Section 30(A). See Principal Dissent at 24 
(Boren Amendment "mandates minimum reimbursement 
rates defined by reference to quality of care . . . .") id. at 33 
(rates must be "sufficient to ensure quality of care"); id. at 
33 (same). In fact, however, quality of care played a 
decidedly secondary role in the Boren Amendment. 
Whereas quality of care is a primary benchmark for setting 
payments in Section 30(A), the Boren Amendment simply 
provided that reimbursements were to be calculated by 
reference to the reasonable costs of providers that were 
operating in compliance with other applicable legal 
requirements -- in the precise language of the Amendment, 
"with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and 
quality and safety standards . . . ." 42 U.S.C. Section 
1396a(a)(13)(A) (repealed 1997). Thus, for example, in 
determining the reasonable costs of a nursing home, the 
Boren Amendment looked to nursing homes that were 
complying with state fire safety laws rather than those that 
cut costs by doing without fire escapes, smoke detectors, 
etc. (The principal dissent obscures this point by repeatedly 
eliding the reference to "State and Federal laws[and] 
regulations" and referring only to "quality and safety 
standards." See Principal Dissent at 31, 33, 35.)15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We also disagree with Judge Rendell's view that Section 30(A) 
manifests an intent to benefit providers simply because it says that a 
state plan must provide methods and procedures "relating to the 
utilization of, and payment for, care and services available under the 
plan." 
 
First, Judge Rendell's analysis looks at only part of Section 30(A), but 
we do not think that it is possible to determine whether Section 30(A) 
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In attempting to point out what we view as the critical 
differences between the Boren Amendment and Section 
30(A), we do not dispute the obvious point that these 
provisions have other features in common, as the principal 
dissent points out. For instance, the principal dissent is 
correct in noting that "[b]oth the Boren Amendment and 
Section 30(A) require states to reimburse providers for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
was intended to benefit providers or just recipients without looking at 
the entire provision. Moreover, although Judge Rendell would look at 
only one part of Section 30(A) in determining whether that provision was 
intended to benefit providers, we assume that she would look at the rest 
of the provision in determining whether Section 30(A) meets the next 
requirement set out in Wilder and Blessing, viz., that the right allegedly 
protected by the statute must not be so "vague and amorphous" that its 
enforcement would strain judicial competence. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 
340-41; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509. If she did not do so -- if she confined 
her analysis of this question to the portion of the statute that she 
examines in relation to the intent-to-benefit issue-- she would have to 
conclude that this second requirement cannot be met. If Section 30(A) 
simply said that a state plan must "provide . . . methods and procedures 
relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and services 
available under the plan," it would not set out a standard that a court 
could enforce. The substance of what a state plan must meet is set out 
in the portion of Section 30(A) that follows, and this part of the 
provision 
cannot be ignored. We see no justification for examining only one part of 
a statute in considering the intent-to-benefit issue and then considering 
other parts of the statute in considering other prongs of the 
Wilder/Blessing inquiry. 
 
Second, if the mere reference to "payment" in the part of Section 30(A) 
that Judge Rendell examines were enough to show an intent to benefit 
providers, it would be virtually impossible to draft a provision requiring 
a state plan to provide services without creating an entitlement to sue on 
behalf of the providers who furnish those services. Providers, after all, 
must be paid, and according to Judge Rendell's position, if a statute 
makes any mention of "payment," it evidences an intent to benefit 
providers. It is interesting to apply Judge Rendell's analysis to the 
current version of 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(13), which replaced the Boren 
Amendment. One of Congress's main objectives -- perhaps its dominant 
objective -- in repealing the Boren Amendment was to take away the 
right to sue under S 1983, but the provision that replaced the Boren 
Amendment, refers to the "determination of rates of payment under the 
[state] plan" and goes on to refer repeatedly to "rates." 
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services rendered." Principal Dissent at 32. But as we 
began by cautioning, the inquiry mandated by Wilder and 
Blessing - whether Congress intended for Section 30(A) to 
benefit providers as opposed to simply knowing  that 
providers would be benefitted -- calls for us to draw a fine 
line and to take into account the precise statutory language 
adopted by Congress. After considering the language of the 
Boren Amendment and Section 30(A), we remain convinced 
that there are critical differences and that Section 30(A), 
unlike the Boren Amendment, was not intended to benefit 
providers. 
 
C. 
 
We have examined the legislative history of Section 30(A) 
and have found nothing inconsistent with our reading of 
the statutory language. The plaintiffs note that when 
Section 30(A) was originally enacted in 1967, see Social 
Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. 90-248, S 237, 81 
Stat. 821, 911 (1968), it differed in two respects from the 
current version: it required a state plan to assure that 
payments were "not in excess of reasonable charges," and 
it lacked the adequate access requirement that the current 
version contains.16 In 1981, Congress changed these 
features. 
 
Nothing in the 1981 amendments suggests that the 
current version of the statute is intended to benefit 
providers. On the contrary, the effect of the 1981 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. As enacted in 1967, it required a state to: 
 
       provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, 
       and the payment for, care and services available under the plan as 
       may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of 
       such care and services and to assure that payments .. . are not in 
       excess of reasonable charges consistent with efficiency, economy, 
       and quality of care. 
 
This provision originated as a Senate Amendment to the House bill, and 
the brief discussion of this provision in the Conference Committee report 
says nothing that has a bearing on the issue before us. See Conf. Rep. 
No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3179, 3213 (1967). 
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amendments was to sharpen the focus on Medicaid 
beneficiaries. Language referring to providers' charges was 
removed, and language providing a further protection for 
beneficiaries was added. 
 
The plaintiffs note, however, that the House Committee 
Report on the 1981 amendments observed that "in 
instances where the States or the Secretary fail to observe 
these statutory requirements, the courts would be expected 
to take appropriate remedial action." H.R. Rep. No. 158, 
97th Cong., 312-13 (1981). This statement certainly 
suggests that the Committee anticipated that some class of 
plaintiffs would be able to sue to enforce Section 30(A), but 
it does not show that the Committee anticipated that 
Medicaid providers, as opposed to recipients, would be able 
to do so. It is thus of little value for present purposes. 
 
The plaintiffs rely, finally, on certain HHS regulations 
that the plaintiffs view as showing that HHS has 
interpreted Section 30(A) as intended to benefit providers. 
We have examined these regulations, and we do not believe 
that they evidence any such interpretation. The most 
pertinent of the current regulations cited by the plaintiffs 
establish upper limits on what a state program may pay for 
drugs. See 42 C.F.R. SS 447.301, 447.331- .334 (2001). 
Section 447.331(b), which applies to brand name drugs 
duly certified by a physician to be medically necessary for 
a particular recipient, is illustrative. This provision states 
that a state agency's payments for such drugs 
 
       must not exceed in the aggregate, payment levels that 
       the agency has determined by applying the lower of the 
       -- 
 
       (1)Estimate acquisition costs plus reasonable 
       dispensing fees established by the agency; or 
 
       (2)Providers' usual and customary charges to the 
       general public 
 
These regulations do not assist the plaintiffs here for the 
obvious reason that they merely set a ceiling, but no floor, 
on what providers must be paid. Any payments below the 
ceiling, no matter how low, would satisfy the regulation. 
Accordingly, the regulations do not show that the Secretary 
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has interpreted Section 30(A) as intended to benefit 
providers; nor can they be viewed as themselves intended to 
benefit providers.17 
 
In sum, we are convinced that Section 30(A) is not 
intended to benefit providers and that therefore providers 
may not assert a Section 30(A) claim under S 1983. 
 
D. 
 
Of the other courts of appeals that have considered the 
question whether providers may assert a Section 30(A) 
claim under S 1983, the Fifth Circuit's opinion contains the 
most thorough analysis of the intended-to-benefit 
requirement. See Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. 
Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 928-29 (5th Cir. 2000); see also 
Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001). In 
Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, the Fifth Circuit wrote: 
 
       Section 30(A) . . . focuses on recipients in that it is 
       directly keyed to the recipients' access to medical care, 
       and as a result, the recipients are the direct intended 
       beneficiaries of the section. . . . [I]n contrast to the 
       Boren Amendment, section 30(A) does not create an 
       individual entitlement in favor of any provider. The 
       section benefits recipients by ensuring there is an 
       adequate number of providers in the marketplace. 
       Therefore, it may be true that health care providers as 
       a group are indirectly benefitted by section 30(A) 
       because the section requires that the payments to 
       providers be sufficient to ensure that Medicaid 
       recipients have equal access to medical care. But it 
       cannot be said that section 30(A) necessarily confers 
       upon each provider an individual right to a particular 
       payment because the section does not focus directly on 
       providers. 
 
235 F.3d at 928-29 (emphasis in the original). We agree 
with the Fifth Circuit's analysis and holding. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. In South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. 
Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), we held that a regulation may invoke 
a private right of action that Congress created through statutory text but 
may not create a new right. 
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Prior to the decision in Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, 
the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had held that 
providers may pursue a Section 30(A) action underS 1983, 
but we decline to follow these decisions. See Visiting Nurse 
Ass'n of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1004 (1st 
Cir. 1996); Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan , 91 F.3d 1026, 
1029 (7th Cir. 1996); Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 
6 F.3d 519, 526 (8th Cir. 1993).18 
 
In Arkansas Medical Society, the Eighth Circuit reasoned 
as follows: 
 
       The question of whether the Medicaid providers are 
       intended beneficiaries is . . . easily resolved. Wilder 
       concluded that institutional providers were intended 
       beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment because the 
       Amendment concerned their reimbursement. Wilder, 496 
       U.S. at 510, 110 S.Ct. at 2517. Similarly, the equal 
       access provision [of Section 30(A)] addresses payment 
       for "care and services" provided by noninstitutional 
       providers. The providers here are beneficiaries for the 
       same reason that the providers in Wilder were 
       beneficiaries. 
 
6 F.3d at 526 (emphasis added). 
 
This analysis pays little attention to the differing terms of 
the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A) and is thus 
inconsistent with the reminder in Suter to examine each 
particular statutory provision "in detail." 503 U.S. at 357. 
Arkansas Medical Society fails to note that the Boren 
Amendment was keyed to providers' costs, whereas Section 
30(A) focuses on the care and services available to 
recipients. Moreover, while Arkansas Medical Society read 
Wilder to mean that the Boren Amendment was intended to 
benefit providers simply because it "concerned their 
reimbursement," 6 F.3d at 526, Wilder actually relied on 
the fact that the Boren Amendment "establishe[d] a system 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. In Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997), the 
Court held in favor of a hospital that appealed an adverse decision 
regarding a Section 30(A) claim brought under S 1983. However, the 
Court's opinion provides no indication that the hospital's right to 
proceed 
under S 1983 was challenged, and the Court did not address the issue. 
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for reimbursement of providers and [was] phrased in terms 
benefitting health care providers." Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510 
(emphasis added). As we have noted, the same cannot be 
said of Section 30(A). 
 
In Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, supra, the Seventh 
Circuit held that Medicaid providers may assert Section 
30(A) claims under S 1983, but the opinion provides no 
indication that the Seventh Circuit was presented with the 
question whether Section 30(A) was intended to benefit 
providers. Instead, the opinion merely addresses-- and 
rejects -- the district court's holding that providers could 
not sue under Section 30(A) because the term "geographic 
area"19 is so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement 
would strain judicial competence. Methodist Hosp. v. 
Indiana Family and Social Services Admin., 860 F. Supp. 
1309, 1331- 33 (N.D. In. 1994). 
 
In Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 
supra, the argument presented to the First Circuit 
regarding the intended-to-benefit requirement was notably 
different from the argument presented to us. In Visiting 
Nurse Ass'n, it was argued that Section 30(A), unlike the 
Boren Amendment, is not intended to benefit providers 
because Section 30(A) "does not list specific categories of 
health care providers (e.g., hospitals, nursing facilities, and 
intermediate care facilities." 93 F.3d at 1004. The First 
Circuit rejected this attempted distinction and wrote: 
 
       The Wilder Court first observed that the statute "is 
       phrased in terms benefitting health care providers," 
       and leaves "little doubt that health care providers are 
       the intended beneficiaries," then proceeded to illustrate 
       how the plain language of the Boren Amendment 
       "establishes a system for reimbursement of providers" 
       through its listing of specific types of health care 
       providers. Nowhere did the Court indicate that the 
       more general term "providers" would not suffice, 
       however, or that a listing of specific types of providers 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. As previously noted, Section 30(A) requires that a plan assure that 
"care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent 
that 
such care and services are available to the general population in the 
geographic area." 42 U.S.C. S 1396a (30)(A)(emphasis added). 
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       is a sine qua non without which a congressional intent 
       to benefit health care providers could not be inferred. 
       As long as the two statutory provisions evince a 
       congressional concern for preserving financial 
       incentives to providers--by ensuring adequate 
       reimbursement payment levels--providers are 
       appropriately considered intended beneficiaries. See 
       Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc., 6 F.3d at 526. 
 
93 F.3d at 1004 (italics in quotations from Wilder added by 
First Circuit). To the extent that the First Circuit rejected 
the particular argument advanced to it, its decision has no 
bearing on the issue we address here. And to the extent 
that the First Circuit simply adopted the reasoning of 
Arkansas Medical Society, we find that reasoning 
unpersuasive for the reasons already explained. 
 
After considering all of the decisions of other courts of 
appeals on the question before us, we agree with the Fifth 
Circuit's analysis in Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, and 
we respectfully decline to follow the contrary courts of 
appeals decisions. 
 
E. 
 
Our conclusion that providers may not assert Section 
30(A) claims under S 1983 does not mean that Section 
30(A)'s important "quality of care" and access requirements 
will go unenforced. Not only is HHS responsible for 
ensuring that state plans are administered in accordance 
with these requirements, see 42 U.S.C. S 1396c, but 
Medicaid recipients plainly satisfy the intended-to-benefit 
requirement and are thus potential private plaintiffs. In 
other parts of the country, recipients have sued to enforce 
Section 30(A), and the other courts of appeals have 
uniformly held that recipients may assert such claims 
under S 1983. See Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, 235 
F.3d at 927; Visiting Nurses Ass'n, 93 F.3d at 1004 n.7; 
Arkansas Medical Society, 6 F.3d at 526. If, as the plaintiffs 
in this case allege, the rates set under the HealthChoices 
program are so low that compliance with the "quality of 
care" and access requirements is threatened, we see no 
reason to believe that recipients in the affected area of the 
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Commonwealth will not seek legal redress to ensure that 
these critical mandates are met. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons explained above, the order of the District 
Court is affirmed. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, dissenting, with whom Judges 
Mansmann,* Scirica, McKee and Rendell join. 
 
The focus of the majority opinion, quite properly, is on 
whether Section 30(A) is intended to benefit the provider 
plaintiffs. To reach the result that it was not, the majority 
must distinguish the case central to the outcome, Wilder v. 
Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), which 
held that the Boren Amendment, a statute that by its 
express terms required states to establish a scheme for 
reimbursement of Medicaid healthcare providers, is 
intended to benefit providers. The majority attempts to do 
so by reasoning that the Boren Amendment and Section 
30(A) "contrast[ ] sharply." Maj. Op. at 11. I disagree, for as 
I will explain, the two statutes confer nearly identical rights 
on providers. Hence this case is squarely controlled by 
Wilder, which compels the conclusion that healthcare 
providers may sue under S 1983 to enforce their rights 
under Section 30(A). The clear majority of Circuits to 
address the question whether healthcare providers may sue 
under S 1983 to enforce their rights under Section 30(A) 
have resolved that question in the affirmative, and my views 
are in accord. 
 
As the majority observes, the Boren Amendment and 
Section 30(A) differ textually insofar as the Boren 
Amendment's reference to provider costs in its definition of 
reimbursement rates is absent from Section 30(A). The 
rationale of Wilder, however, renders this difference 
immaterial, since Wilder nowhere relied on the Boren 
Amendment's reference to provider costs in concluding that 
providers were intended beneficiaries of that statute. 
Rather, Wilder clearly explained that the reason providers 
were intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment is that 
the provision by its express terms required states to 
establish a scheme for provider reimbursement. See Wilder, 
496 U.S. at 510. Similarly, Section 30(A) expressly requires 
states to establish a system for reimbursing providers for 
services rendered. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* The Honorable Carol Los Mansmann participated in the oral argument 
and joined in this opinion, but died before the opinion could be filed. 
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Much of the majority opinion is devoted to explaining 
why Medicaid recipients are among the intended 
beneficiaries of Section 30(A). I agree, but a statute can 
have more than one class of intended beneficiaries and 
hence the mere fact that Congress intended Section 30(A) to 
benefit Medicaid recipients has no bearing on whether 
Congress also intended Section 30(A) to benefit Medicaid 
providers. By its own terms, Section 30(A) is addressed to 
both healthcare providers and Medicaid recipients, for, like 
the Boren Amendment, it expressly requires states to 
establish a scheme for provider reimbursement and 
mandates minimum reimbursement rates defined by 
reference to quality of care and recipients' access to care 
and services. Hence, Wilder controls. 
 
While this brief introduction sets up the analytical core of 
this opinion, it is deficient to the extent that it lacks context 
-- the dynamic of the real world of healthcare. 
Unfortunately, so does the majority opinion, which, while 
commendably terse, is short on "realpolitik." I will therefore 
supply that broader context, which implicates the 
relationship between provider costs and the availability of 
services to Medicaid recipients. The background of this case 
is the recent change in the Medicaid system in the five- 
county Philadelphia metropolitan area from fee-for-service 
to managed care. The plaintiffs have adduced evidence 
designed to demonstrate that the HMOs, in administering 
Medicaid, have squeezed the pharmacies and reduced 
provider reimbursement rates to levels that, according to 
the plaintiffs, are below any reasonable measure of the cost 
of providing care and services. As a practical matter, if the 
HMOs set provider reimbursement rates too low, providers 
will simply refuse to render services to Medicaid recipients, 
and recipients will go without adequate access. In fact, 50% 
of the pharmacies that participated in Medicaid in the five 
county area have dropped out since 1997. The plaintiffs 
also produced evidence that no pharmacy within fifteen 
contiguous zip codes in Bucks and Montgomery counties 
participates in Medicaid, and that among those pharmacies 
in the five-county area that continue to participate in 
Medicaid, quality of care has suffered as a result of 
inadequate reimbursement rates. 
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While the plaintiffs' submissions in this area are 
contested, and failure to establish that the challenged 
reimbursement rates violate Section 30(A)'s quality of care 
and adequate access mandates would be fatal to their case, 
they demonstrate a nexus between the interests of 
providers and the interests of recipients, which is 
recognized by the express terms of Section 30(A). Moreover, 
given the financial straits of Medicaid recipients and 
providers' access to information on the relationship between 
reimbursement rates and provider participation in 
Medicaid, healthcare providers may be better able to 
enforce recipients' and providers' shared interest in 
assuring that provider reimbursement rates comply with 
the mandates of Section 30(A). 
 
I thus respectfully dissent from the conclusion that 
S 1983 does not grant providers a cause of action to sue for 
violations of Section 30(A). Since the Court has not gone 
beyond the threshold issue of whether S 1983 grants 
providers a right of action to enforce Section 30(A), I would 
reconstitute the original panel so that it may resolve the 
merits of the Department's summary judgment motion, 
which requires determining whether plaintiffs have 
produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find 
that the challenged reimbursement rates violate Section 
30(A)'s quality of care and adequate access mandates, an 
issue on which I express no opinion. 
 
I. 
 
The managed care program at issue is HealthChoices, 
under which the Pennsylvania Department of Public 
Welfare has contracted with four HMOs to administer the 
Medicaid program in the five-county area. The Department 
agrees to pay the HMOs on a per-person basis, and permits 
the HMOs to set pharmacy reimbursement rates. The 
plaintiffs allege that the pharmacy reimbursement rates set 
by the HMOs are below any reasonable estimate of 
pharmacies' costs, and that unless rates are at least 
adequate to cover providers' costs, they cannot be 
consistent with quality of care or sufficient to induce 
enough pharmacies to participate in Medicaid so that 
Medicaid recipients have the same access to pharmacies as 
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members of the general population, as is required by 
Section 30(A). 
 
In support of their claim that current rates are 
inconsistent with quality of care, the plaintiff pharmacists 
produced evidence that: (1) low reimbursement rates 
prevent them from dispensing or stocking certain drugs; (2) 
low reimbursement rates require them to cut back on 
services provided to customers, such as counseling 
customers about how to use their medication; (3) 
administrative problems with the HealthChoices HMOs 
prevent their customers from obtaining medication; (4) 
HealthChoices HMOs force their customers to change 
repeatedly their medication, causing delays and leading to 
health problems when the new medication is ineffective; (5) 
HealthChoices HMOs restrict the formularies that may be 
used to fill customer prescriptions, causing delays in 
customers' prescriptions being filled, often to the detriment 
of customers' health; and (6) HealthChoices HMOs make 
medical judgments on a daily basis over the phone and 
deny medications that they know nothing about. 
 
In support of their allegation that the reimbursement 
rates fall below the minimum rates mandated by Section 
30(A)'s access requirement, plaintiffs produced evidence 
showing a precipitous drop in the number of pharmacies in 
the five-county area who participate in Medicaid since the 
inception of HealthChoices. In particular, 50% of the 
pharmacies that participated in Medicaid have dropped out 
since 1997. Plaintiffs also produced evidence that the 
HealthChoices reimbursement rates are the lowest rates in 
the five-county area, and that whereas the Blue Cross 
network has 963 participating pharmacies in the five- 
county area, the four HealthChoices HMOs have only 600, 
635, 794, and 864 pharmacies each participating in their 
networks. Moreover, there are no pharmacies that 
participate in Medicaid in fifteen contiguous zip codes in 
Bucks and Montgomery counties. Consequently, according 
to the plaintiffs, Medicaid recipients lack access to 
pharmacies to the same extent as the general population. 
 
Whether this evidence is sufficient to create a triable 
issue of fact as to whether the current rates violate Section 
30(A)'s quality of care and adequate access mandate is, of 
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course, disputed by the Department. My purpose in 
summarizing this evidence is not to express a view as to 
whether this evidence is sufficient for plaintiffs' claims to 
survive summary judgment, but rather to provide concrete 
evidence of the common interest shared by providers and 
recipients in enforcing the provider reimbursement rates 
mandated by Section 30(A). 
 
On its face Section 30(A) is addressed to both healthcare 
providers and Medicaid recipients, as it expressly requires 
states to establish a scheme for provider reimbursement 
and mandates minimum reimbursement rates defined by 
reference to recipients' quality of care and access to care 
and services. In particular, Section 30(A) requires states to 
"provide . . . methods and procedures relating to. . . the 
payment for[ ] care and services available under the plan" 
and to reimburse providers at rates that are "consistent 
with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are 
sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and 
services are available under the plan at least to the extent 
that such care and services are available to the general 
population in the geographic area." 
 
The House Report on the 1989 amendment to Section 
30(A) confirms Congress's recognition that because 
healthcare providers' participation in Medicaid is voluntary, 
Medicaid recipients' access to healthcare will suffer if 
provider reimbursement rates are too low to induce a 
sufficient number of providers to participate in Medicaid: 
 
       There is no doubt that Medicaid reimbursement rates 
       have not kept pace with average community rates. . .. 
       The Committee believes that, without adequate 
       payment levels, it is simply unrealistic to expect 
       physicians to participate in the program. . . .[T]he 
       Committee bill would require that Medicaid payments 
       for all practitioners be sufficient to enlist enough 
       providers so that care and service are available under 
       the plan at least to the extent that such care and 
       services are available to the general population in the 
       geographic area. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, at 390 (1989), reprinted in 1989 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2060, 2116. As the majority notes, Section 
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30(A)'s legislative history also indicates that Congress 
intended Section 30(A) to be enforced through private 
actions. See H.R. Rep. No. 158, at 312-13 (1981) ("[I]n 
instances where the States or the Secretary fail to observe 
these statutory requirements, the courts would be expected 
to take appropriate remedial action."). 
 
The evidence we have described illustrates the manner in 
which the interests of healthcare providers and Medicaid 
recipients are inextricably intertwined. As we noted in West 
Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11 (3d 
Cir. 1989), aff 'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 83 (1991): 
 
       We recognize, of course, that the primary purpose of 
       medicaid is to achieve the praiseworthy social objective 
       of granting health care coverage to those who cannot 
       afford it. It does not necessarily follow, however, that 
       Title XIX grants substantive rights only to medicaid 
       patients. Although the broad purpose of the Medicaid 
       Act as a whole is to help the poor attain medical care, 
       the specific purpose of section 1396a(a)(13)(A) is to 
       assure state compliance with some federal standard of 
       hospital reimbursement. The section sets up a plan for 
       the adequate and reasonable reimbursement of 
       hospitals which serve medicaid patients, and thus 
       hospitals are the section's "beneficiaries." Their 
       interests and the interests of medicaid patients are 
       bonded by a common goal, the delivery of adequate 
       health care by the hospitals to state medicaid patients 
       and the enjoyment of such care by the patients. The 
       interests of both are intertwined and hospitals have a 
       concrete stake in reimbursement in accordance with 
       the federal statute and regulations. 
 
Id. at 20. Against this backdrop, I now turn to the doctrinal 
question whether S 1983 grants healthcare providers a 
cause of action to enforce Section 30(A). 
 
II. 
 
Until now, nearly every Circuit to consider the issue has 
held that whether providers may bring actions under 
S 1983 to enforce the mandates of Section 30(A) is squarely 
controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Wilder, which 
 
                                28 
  
of course remains binding on this Court unless the 
Supreme Court overrules it. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("[I]t is this Court's prerogative alone to 
overrule one of its precedents."). The first Court of Appeals 
to consider the issue was the Eighth Circuit in Arkansas 
Medical Society, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 
1993), which concluded that Section 30(A) is 
indistinguishable from the Boren Amendment, which the 
Supreme Court in Wilder held was enforceable by providers 
under S 1983: 
 
       Our analysis in this case is greatly simplified by the 
       Wilder opinion. Although focusing on a different 
       subsection, Wilder addressed the same statute facing 
       us in this case. Suter urges a careful scrutiny of the 
       exact legislation at issue and Wilder has already done 
       that. . . . [T]he equal access provision is very analogous 
       to the Boren Amendment examined in Wilder; they are 
       similar not only in function but also in the specific 
       language employed. 
 
Id. at 525. With regard to the particular question whether 
providers are among the intended beneficiaries of Section 
30(A), the Court determined that: 
 
       The question of whether the Medicaid providers are 
       intended beneficiaries is also easily resolved. Wilder 
       concluded that institutional providers were intended 
       beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment because the 
       Amendment concerned their reimbursement. Similarly, 
       the equal access provision [of Section 30(A)] addresses 
       payment for "care and services" provided by 
       noninstitutional providers. The providers here are 
       beneficiaries for the same reason that the providers in 
       Wilder were beneficiaries. 
 
Id. at 526 (internal citations omitted). 
 
The First Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have also easily 
resolved the issue whether providers may bring S 1983 
actions to enforce Section 30(A) by noting that the question 
is squarely controlled by Wilder. In Visiting Nurse 
Association of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st 
Cir. 1996), the First Circuit concluded that providers are 
among the intended beneficiaries of Section 30(A) for the 
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same reason that the Supreme Court held that they were 
among the intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment: 
 
       The Wilder Court first observed that the[Boren 
       Amendment] "is phrased in terms benefitting health 
       care providers," and leaves "little doubt that health 
       care providers are the intended beneficiaries," then 
       proceeded to illustrate how the plain language of the 
       Boren Amendment "establishes a system for 
       reimbursement of providers" . . . . As long as the two 
       statutory provisions evince a congressional concern for 
       preserving financial incentives to providers -- by 
       ensuring adequate reimbursement payment levels -- 
       providers are appropriately considered intended 
       beneficiaries. 
 
Id. at 1004 (emphasis and internal citations omitted). 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit observed that because Wilder 
had not been overruled, "Wilder's holding binds us," and 
consequently held that providers have a private right of 
action under S 1983 to enforce Section 30(A). See Methodist 
Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996) 
("We therefore . . . hold that providers of medical care have 
a private right of action, derived through S 1983, to enforce 
S 1396a(a)(30)."). Thus, most courts have found that 
whether S 1983 grants providers a cause of action to 
enforce Section 30(A) is an issue that is easily disposed of 
by Wilder. Until now, the only Circuit to hold otherwise is 
the Fifth Circuit in Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. 
Hood, 235 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2000), which I discuss in 
Section IV, infra. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
The majority holds that providers may not sue under 
S 1983 to enforce Section 30(A) because they are not among 
the provision's intended beneficiaries.1  Like most Courts of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I disagree with the majority's replacement of the requirement under 
S 1983 that "Congress must have intended that the provision in question 
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Appeals to consider the issue, I believe that the inquiry into 
whether providers are among the intended beneficiaries of 
Section 30(A) begins and ends with Wilder. 
 
The Boren Amendment, which was the statute that 
providers sought to enforce in Wilder, provided, in relevant 
part: 
 
       A State plan for medical assistance must . . . provide 
       . . . for payment . . . of hospital services, nursing 
       facilities, and services in an intermediate care facility 
       for the mentally retarded provided under the plan 
       through the use of rates . . . which the State finds. . . 
       are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which 
       must be incurred by efficiently and economically 
       operated facilities in order to provide care and services 
       in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, 
       regulations, and quality and safety standards and to 
       assure that individuals eligible for medical assistance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
benefit the plaintiff," Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997), 
with the stricter requirement, drawn from an implied right of action case, 
that the statute must be "draft[ed] . . . with an unmistakable focus on 
the benefitted class." Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979). 
See Maj. Op. at 9, 11. The Supreme Court has made clear that: 
 
       [Whether a cause of action exists under S 1983] is a different 
inquiry 
       than that involved in determining whether a private right of action 
       can be implied from a particular statute. In implied right of 
action 
       cases, we employ the four-factor Cort test to determine whether 
       Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted for the 
       violation of statutory rights. The test reflects a concern, 
grounded in 
       separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls 
       the availability of remedies for violations of statutes. Because S 
1983 
       provides an alternative source of express congressional 
       authorization of private suits, these separation-of-powers concerns 
       are not present in a S 1983 case. 
 
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court has never held that to be enforceable under S 1983, 
a provision must also be "draft[ed] . . . with an unmistakable focus on 
the benefitted class," Cannon, 441 U.S. at 692, as the majority asserts. 
Rather, in the S 1983 context, a plaintiff must simply show that the 
provision in question was "intended to benefit" the plaintiff. Golden 
State 
Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). 
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       have reasonable access (taking into account geographic 
       location and reasonable travel time) to inpatient 
       hospital services of adequate quality . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(13)(A) (repealed). 
 
The text of Section 30(A) is strikingly similar. It provides, 
in relevant part: 
 
       A State plan for medical assistance must . . . provide 
       such methods and procedures relating to the utilization 
       of, and the payment for, care and services available 
       under the plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard 
       against unnecessary utilization of such care and 
       services and to assure that payments are consistent 
       with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are 
       sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and 
       services are available under the plan at least to the 
       extent that such care and services are available to the 
       general population in the geographic area . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(30)(A). Comparing the two statutes, I 
can find no principled basis for holding that providers are 
intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment, as the 
Supreme Court held in Wilder, but are not intended 
beneficiaries of Section 30(A), as the majority holds today. 
In particular, I cannot accept the majority's contention that 
"[t]he language of Section 30(A) contrasts sharply with that 
of the Boren Amendment." Maj. Op. at 11. 
 
Both the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A) require 
states to reimburse providers for services rendered. See 
Boren Amendment ("A State plan for medical assistance 
must . . . provide . . . for payment . . . of . . . services . . . 
provided under the plan . . . ."); Section 30(A) ("A State plan 
for medical assistance must . . . provide . . . methods and 
procedures relating to . . . payment for, care and services 
available under the plan . . . ."). And both the Boren 
Amendment and Section 30(A) define reimbursement rates 
by reference to efficiency and economy. See Boren 
Amendment (defining rates by reference to "efficiently and 
economically operated facilities"); Section 30(A) (requiring 
states "to assure that payments are consistent with 
efficiency [and] economy"). 
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Both the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A) require 
states to reimburse providers at rates that are sufficient to 
ensure quality of care. See Boren Amendment (requiring 
that reimbursement rates be "reasonable and adequate to 
meet the costs which must be incurred . . . in order to 
provide care and services in conformity with . . . quality 
and safety standards"); Section 30(A) (requiring states "to 
assure that payments are consistent with . . . quality of 
care"). And both the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A) 
require states to reimburse providers at rates that are 
sufficient to guarantee Medicaid recipients adequate access 
to healthcare. See Boren Amendment (requiring "rates . . . 
which . . . are reasonable and adequate . . . to assure that 
individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable 
access . . . to inpatient hospital services"); Section 30(A) 
(requiring states "to assure that payments are . . . sufficient 
to enlist enough providers so that care and services are 
available under the plan at least to the extent that such 
care and services are available to the general population in 
the geographic area"). 
 
Thus, far from "contrast[ing] sharply," as the majority 
contends, see Maj. Op. at 11, the Boren Amendment and 
Section 30(A) confer on providers nearly identical rights to 
be reimbursed for services provided and to be reimbursed 
at a minimum rate that is defined by reference to quality of 
care and adequate access. See Ark. Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 525 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he equal 
access provision [of Section 30(A)] is very analogous to the 
Boren Amendment examined in Wilder; they are similar not 
only in function but also in the specific language 
employed."). This case is therefore squarely controlled by 
Wilder, and I would hold that healthcare providers may 
bring S 1983 actions to enforce the rights conferred on 
them by Section 30(A).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. I fully concur in the majority's distinction between "the question 
whether a statute is intended to benefit particular plaintiffs" and "the 
question whether the statute in fact benefits  those plaintiffs." Maj. Op. 
at 
8. Similarly, I agree with the majority's observation that "lessors of 
pharmacy premises, cleaning service firms retained by pharmacies, trash 
collection companies retained by pharmacies, [and] private security firms 
retained by pharmacies" may all benefit from Section 30(A). Maj. Op. at 
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B. 
 
The majority's rationale relies heavily on the fact that 
Section 30(A) is addressed in part to recipients, since it 
defines provider reimbursement rates by reference to 
quality of care and adequate access. See Maj. Op. at 11 
("[Section 30(A)'s] directives to provide`quality of care' and 
adequate access . . . . are drafted with an unmistakable 
focus on Medicaid beneficiaries, not providers."); id. at 12 
("[Section 30(A)] demands that payments be set at levels 
that are sufficient to meet recipients' needs."); id. ("[T]he 
adequacy of payments [under Section 30(A)] is measured in 
relation to the health needs of recipients."); id. at 19 
("Section 30(A) focuses on the care and services available to 
recipients."); id. at 12 ("It is therefore apparent from the 
statutory language that the intended beneficiaries of 
Section 30(A) are recipients, not providers."). 
 
To rely on the quality of care and adequate access 
guarantees as a basis for holding that Section 30(A) was 
not intended to benefit providers, however, would require 
overruling Wilder, which squarely held that a statute that 
defines provider reimbursement rates by reference to 
Medicaid recipients' quality of care and Medicaid recipients' 
access to care and services may nonetheless be intended to 
benefit providers. Nowhere in Wilder did either the majority 
or the dissent even hint that the Boren Amendment's 
reference to quality of care and adequate access should give 
the Court pause before concluding that the Boren 
Amendment was intended to benefit providers. As such, for 
purposes of determining whether providers are intended 
beneficiaries of Section 30(A), Wilder renders irrelevant the 
fact that Section 30(A) includes quality of care and 
adequate access guarantees. 
 
Inexplicably, then, the majority makes the adequate 
access and quality of care guarantees that are found in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. But I have little difficulty in concluding that these third parties are 
not among the intended beneficiaries of Section 30(A), for the simple 
reason that Section 30(A) expressly requires states to establish a scheme 
for reimbursing those who provide healthcare services, not garbage 
collection services or security services. 
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both the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A) the 
cornerstone of its analysis in holding that providers are not 
intended beneficiaries of Section 30(A). To be consistent 
with Wilder, which held that providers are intended 
beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment, however, a rationale 
leading to the conclusion that providers are not  intended 
beneficiaries of Section 30(A) must rest not on similarities 
between the Boren Amendment and Section 30(A), as does 
the vast bulk of the majority opinion, but rather on 
differences. 
 
C. 
 
The only difference between the Boren Amendment and 
Section 30(A) that the majority relies on is the Boren 
Amendment's reference to providers' costs, which is absent 
from Section 30(A). For the reasons discussed below, 
however, the reference to providers' costs in the Boren 
Amendment and the absence of such a reference in Section 
30(A) are immaterial for purposes of determining whether 
providers are among the intended beneficiaries of Section 
30(A). 
 
First, the language of the Boren Amendment did not 
create any independent right on the part of providers to be 
reimbursed for their costs without reference to quality of 
care, as the majority maintains. The majority repeatedly 
quotes the language in the Boren Amendment requiring 
payments to be "reasonable and adequate to meet the costs 
which must be incurred by efficiently and economically 
operated facilities," Maj. Op. at 10, 11, but neglects to 
quote the remainder of the clause, which goes on to 
expressly define costs in terms of quality of care. In fact, 
the Boren Amendment required payment for "the costs 
which must be incurred by efficiently and economically 
operated facilities in order to provide care and services in 
conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, 
regulations, and quality and safety standards ." (emphases 
added). The plain language of the Boren Amendment thus 
explicitly defined "costs" by reference to quality of care, and 
created no independent right of providers to be reimbursed 
for their costs beyond that conferred by the quality of care 
requirement, such as exists in Section 30(A). 
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I acknowledge that quality of care guarantees in the two 
statutes are not completely identical -- the Boren 
Amendment requires rates that "meet the costs which must 
be incurred . . . to provide care and services in conformity 
with . . . quality and safety standards," while Section 30(A) 
requires rates that "are consistent with . . . quality of care." 
I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion, however, that 
this difference is so significant that quality of care "played 
a decidedly secondary role in the Boren Amendment," but 
"is a primary benchmark" in Section 30(A). Maj. Op. at 14. 
Indeed, the majority never explains how a reimbursement 
rate could be so low that it violates the Boren Amendment's 
requirement that rates meet "the costs which must be 
incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities 
in order to provide care and services in conformity with 
applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality 
and safety standards," yet nonetheless be "consistent with 
. . . quality of care," as mandated by Section 30(A). 
 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the majority is correct 
that the Boren Amendment created an independent right on 
the part of providers to be reimbursed for their costs 
without reference to quality of care, the plaintiffs in Wilder 
were suing to enforce both their right to be reimbursed at 
rates that covered their costs, as well as their independent 
right under the Boren Amendment to be reimbursed at 
rates that are sufficient to ensure adequate access. See 
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 503 ("Respondent contends that 
Virginia's Plan for reimbursement violates the Act because 
the rates are not reasonable and adequate to meet the 
economically and efficiently incurred cost of providing care 
to Medicaid patients in hospitals and do not assure access 
to inpatient care.") (emphasis added and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Had Wilder's holding rested on the Boren 
Amendment's reference to provider costs, as the majority 
contends, then the Court would have permitted the 
providers to sue under S 1983 to enforce only their right to 
be reimbursed for their costs, and not their additional right 
under the Boren Amendment to be reimbursed at rates 
sufficient to ensure recipients adequate access to care and 
services. 
 
The plain language of S 1983 creates a cause of action 
not for a violation of a statute as an undifferentiated whole, 
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but rather for a violation of a "right[ ] . . . secured by the 
Constitution or laws" of the United States. See Blessing v. 
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) ("In order to seek 
redress through S 1983, . . . a plaintiff must assert the 
violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal 
law."); id. at 342 ("It was incumbent upon the respondents 
to identify with particularity the rights they claimed, since 
it is impossible to determine whether Title IV-D, as an 
undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined`rights.' "). By 
permitting the providers' suit to proceed, the Supreme 
Court necessarily held that providers are among the 
intended beneficiaries of not only the Boren Amendment's 
requirement that reimbursement rates be sufficient to cover 
provider costs, but also the Boren Amendment's 
requirement that reimbursement rates be sufficient to 
ensure recipients' adequate access to care and services. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, the Supreme Court's 
rationale in Wilder made clear that in concluding that 
providers were intended beneficiaries of Section 30(A), it 
was relying not on the Boren Amendment's reference to 
providers' costs, as the majority asserts, but rather on the 
Boren Amendment's express requirement that states 
establish a scheme to reimburse providers for services 
rendered. In attempting to distinguish Section 30(A) from 
the Boren Amendment, the majority repeatedly quotes 
Wilder's conclusion that the Boren Amendment"was 
phrased in terms benefitting health care providers," see 
Maj. Op. at 10, 12, 20, but conspicuously omits the rest of 
the sentence, in which the Wilder Court explained why it 
concluded that the Boren Amendment "was phrased in 
terms benefitting health care providers." The remainder of 
the sentence, which the majority never fully quotes, makes 
clear what particular statutory language in the Boren 
Amendment the Court in Wilder was in fact relying on in 
concluding that the Boren Amendment was "phrased in 
terms benefitting providers": 
 
       There can be little doubt that health care providers are 
       the intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment. 
       The provision establishes a system for reimbursement 
       of providers and is phrased in terms benefitting health 
       care providers: It requires a state plan to provide for 
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       "payment of the hospital services, nursing facility 
       services, and services in an intermediate care facility for 
       the mentally retarded provided under the plan."  42 
       U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V) 
 
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510 (internal alterations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 
The majority is "convinced," Maj. Op. at 12, that when 
the Wilder Court stated that the Boren Amendment "is 
phrased in terms benefitting health care providers: It 
requires a state plan to provide for `payment of the hospital 
services, nursing facility services, and services in an 
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded provided 
under the plan,' " the Court was relying on language in the 
Boren Amendment other than the language it directly 
quoted. It is difficult to imagine how a judicial opinion 
could be more clear about what particular statutory 
language it is relying on to establish a given proposition 
than by expressly quoting that language immediately 
following the proposition, as the Supreme Court did in 
Wilder. The majority's conclusion that the Court quoted 
only a portion of the statutory language that it relied on in 
concluding that the Boren Amendment was "phrased in 
terms benefitting health care providers" is particularly 
puzzling given that, according to the majority, that portion 
of the Boren Amendment that the Court actually  quoted in 
the passage above was insufficient to establish the 
proposition for which it was cited, while that portion of the 
Boren Amendment that the Court neglected to quote (the 
Boren Amendment's reference to provider costs) was, 
according to the majority, "plainly a boon for providers," 
and "an unmistakable sign of a congressional desire to 
benefit providers." Maj. Op. at 14. 
 
Indeed, by the majority's reasoning, it is hard to see why 
the Wilder majority, in concluding the Boren Amendment 
was "phrased in terms benefitting health care providers," 
would even bother to quote the particular language in the 
Boren Amendment requiring "payment of the hospital 
services, nursing facility services, and services in an 
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded provided 
under the plan," given that, according to the majority, the 
nearly identical language in Section 30(A) requiring 
 
                                38 
  
"payment for[ ] care and services available under the plan," 
"manifests concern solely for the well-being of recipients." 
Maj. Op. at 12 (emphasis added).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The majority attempts to overcome the obvious difficulty posed by the 
Wilder Court's quotation of the particular language in the Boren 
Amendment that it was relying on by invoking the canon of construction 
that a statute should be construed to avoid rendering any part of it 
superfluous. According to the majority, if the reason that Wilder 
concluded that the Boren Amendment was "phrased in terms benefitting 
health care providers" was that it required a state plan to provide for 
"payment of the hospital services, nursing facility services, and services 
in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded provided under 
the plan" (the language in the Boren Amendment that the Wilder 
majority relied on), then the Supreme Court's "full [sic] sentence (`The 
provision establishes a system for reimbursement of providers and is 
phrased in terms benefitting health care providers') would say exactly the 
same thing twice . . . ." Maj. Op. at 12. 
 
I believe that this reasoning errs by "minutely parsing phrases, and 
seeking shades of meaning in the interstices of sentences and words, as 
though a discursive judicial opinion were a statute." Schlup v. Delo, 513 
U.S. 298, 343 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even if the majority were 
correct that my reading of Wilder renders a portion of a sentence in the 
opinion redundant, it would be neither the first nor the last time that a 
judicial opinion sought clarity at risk of redundancy. Whatever 
redundancy might exist in the sentence at issue in Wilder, I nonetheless 
believe that the Court was relying on the statutory language that it 
quoted when it stated that the Boren Amendment "is phrased in terms 
benefitting health care providers: It requires a state plan to provide for 
`payment of the hospital services, nursing facility services, and services 
in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded provided under 
the plan.' " 
 
At all events, the Supreme Court's statement that the Boren 
Amendment "establishes a system for reimbursement of providers" and 
the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Boren Amendment "is phrased 
in terms benefitting health care providers" because it "requires a state 
plan to provide for `payment of the hospital services, nursing facility 
services, and services in an intermediate care facility for the mentally 
retarded provided under the plan' " do not amount to "say[ing] exactly 
the same thing twice." Maj. Op. at 12. The first statement is addressed 
to the substance of the Boren Amendment (the Boren Amendment 
"establishes a system for reimbursement of providers," 496 U.S. at 510); 
the second statement is addressed to the Boren Amendment's text (the 
Boren Amendment "is phrased in terms benefitting health care providers: 
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Given that the excerpt quoted above contains the Wilder 
Court's entire discussion of whether providers were 
intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment, the 
majority is plainly incorrect when it asserts that"the 
Supreme Court [in Wilder] stressed the Boren Amendment's 
cost-reimbursement language," and that "the Court relied 
on language in the Boren Amendment that measured the 
adequacy of payments in relation to the economics of 
providers, i.e., their need to cover their reasonable costs." 
Maj. Op. at 10 (emphases added). Nowhere in its analysis 
did the Court rely on the Boren Amendment's reference to 
provider costs, much less "stress" such language, as the 
majority contends. And whatever this Court may think 
about the breadth of the Supreme Court's rationale, it is 
not our function to rewrite a Supreme Court opinion to 
narrow its holding by imputing to the Court reliance on a 
fact that played no role in the Court's rationale. Rather, the 
scope of the Wilder Court's holding must be determined by 
reference to the Wilder Court's ratio decidendi as articulated 
by the Wilder Court. 
 
As is readily apparent from the analysis quoted above, 
the Wilder Court made perfectly clear that in concluding 
that "there can be little doubt that healthcare providers are 
the intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment," it was 
relying on the language in the Boren Amendment requiring 
a state plan to provide for "payment of the hospital services, 
nursing facility services, and services in an intermediate 
care facility for the mentally retarded provided under the 
plan." See Ark. Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds , 6 F.3d 519, 
526 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Wilder concluded that institutional 
providers were intended beneficiaries of the Boren 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
It requires a state plan to provide for `payment of the hospital services, 
nursing facility services, and services in an intermediate care facility 
for 
the mentally retarded provided under the plan.' " 496 U.S. at 510). See 
Maj. Op. at 9 (commenting on "the importance of the particular phrasing 
of a statute in this regard"); Maj. Op. at 16 ("[T]he inquiry mandated by 
Wilder and Blessing -- whether Congress intended for Section 30(A) to 
benefit providers as opposed to simply knowing  that providers would be 
benefitted -- calls for us . . . to take into account the precise 
statutory 
language adopted by Congress."). 
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Amendment because the Amendment concerned their 
reimbursement."); see also Evergreen Presbyterian 
Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 925 (5th Cir. 2000) 
("[T]he [Wilder] Court concluded that there was little doubt 
that the providers were the intended beneficiaries of the 
Boren Amendment because it established a system for 
reimbursement of providers and was phrased in terms 
benefitting health care providers, in that it required a state 
plan to provide for their payment.") (internal quotations and 
alterations omitted); Visiting Nurse Ass'n of N. Shore, Inc. v. 
Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1004 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The Wilder 
Court . . . observed that the statute `is phrased in terms 
benefitting health care providers,' and . . . then proceeded 
to illustrate how the plain language of the Boren 
Amendment `establishes a system for reimbursement of 
providers.' ") (emphasis omitted). 
 
Thus, for the same reason that the Wilder Court 
concluded that the Boren Amendment was "phrased in 
terms benefitting health care providers: It requires a state 
plan to provide for `payment of the hospital services, 
nursing facility services, and services in an intermediate 
care facility for the mentally retarded provided under the 
plan,' " 496 U.S. at 510 (quoting the Boren Amendment), I 
would conclude that Section 30(A) is phrased in terms 
benefitting health care providers: It requires a state plan to 
provide for "payment for[ ] care and services available under 
the plan." See Ark. Med. Soc'y, 6 F.3d at 526 ("[T]he equal 
access provision [of Section 30(A)] addresses payment for 
`care and services' provided by noninstitutional providers. 
The providers here are beneficiaries for the same reason 
that the providers in Wilder were beneficiaries."); Visiting 
Nurse Ass'n, 93 F.3d at 1004 (1st Cir. 1996) ("As long as 
the two statutory provisions evince a congressional concern 
for preserving financial incentives to providers-- by 
ensuring adequate reimbursement payment levels -- 
providers are appropriately considered intended 
beneficiaries.").4 
 
(Text continued on page 43) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. One further point needs to be made -- that the majority's departure 
from Wilder creates serious line-drawing problems. Whereas Wilder held 
that any statute that expressly requires states to pay providers is 
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intended to benefit providers, the majority holds that whether such a 
statute is intended to benefit providers depends on how the statute 
defines the minimum payment rate. But the majority never offers an 
analytically sound explanation of how we are to distinguish those 
payment floors that are intended to benefit providers from those 
payment floors that are not. 
 
At times, the majority appears to rely on the fact that the payment 
floor mandated by Section 30(A) is not expressly defined by reference to 
provider costs or provider economics. See Maj. Op. 12 (distinguishing 
Wilder on the ground that the Boren Amendment"measured the 
sufficiency of payments by reference to the economics of providers"); Id. 
at 12 ("Unlike the Boren Amendment, [Section 30(A)] evinces no direct 
concern for the economic situation of providers."). But if the majority's 
test of whether providers are intended beneficiaries of a statute 
requiring 
states to pay providers some minimum amount turns on whether the 
language of the statute expressly defines the minimum reimbursement 
rate by reference to provider costs or provider economics, then providers 
would not be among the intended beneficiaries of a statute that required 
states to pay pharmacies $2,500 each time they dispense a given dosage 
of a particular prescription drug, but would be among the intended 
beneficiaries of a statute that required states to pay providers 1% of 
their 
costs each time they dispensed a drug. In my view, this taxonomy is 
unreasonable. 
 
Elsewhere, the majority appears to rely on the fact that the text of 
Section 30(A) defines the minimum reimbursement rates solely by 
reference to the health needs of recipients. See  Maj. Op. at 12 
(observing 
that under Section 30(A), "the adequacy of payments is measured in 
relation to the health needs of recipients"). But if the majority's test 
of 
whether providers are intended beneficiaries of a statute requiring states 
to pay providers is whether the statute's language expressly defines 
reimbursement rates solely by reference to the health needs of 
recipients, then that test too, produces unreasonable results. Under 
such a test, providers would not be among the intended beneficiaries of 
a statute whose language expressly required states to pay providers ten 
times the rate needed to ensure Medicaid recipients quality of care and 
adequate access, but providers would be intended beneficiaries of a 
statute whose language expressly required states to pay providers a 
dollar every time they filled a Medicaid prescription. 
 
Finally, it may be that the minimum reimbursement rates actually 
mandated by the Boren Amendment were lower than the actual 
minimum rates mandated by Section 30(A). For example, the Boren 
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In sum, although there are differences between the 
specific language of the Boren Amendment and the specific 
language of Section 30(A), as there inevitably will be 
between any two statutes, these differences are immaterial 
in light of Wilder's rationale, and the Supreme Court in 
Wilder gave no indication that its rationale was"good for 
this day and train only." County of Washington v. Gunther, 
452 U.S. 161, 183 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 
IV. 
 
Until now, the only Court of Appeals to hold that 
providers may not bring S 1983 actions to enforce their 
rights under Section 30(A) was the Fifth Circuit in 
Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 
908 (5th Cir. 2000), which I would decline to follow. In 
holding that providers are not among the intended 
beneficiaries of Section 30(A), the Fifth Circuit in Evergreen 
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Blessing 
v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997), which held that a 
plaintiff may sue under S 1983 for a violation of a federal 
statute only if the statute creates an individual entitlement, 
and not simply a systemwide guarantee. Id. at 343. In 
Blessing, the plaintiffs were mothers whose children were 
eligible to receive child support services from the state 
pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Id. at 332. 
Plaintiffs brought a S 1983 action seeking to enforce 42 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Amendment's access requirement mandated that rates be sufficient to 
ensure only that "individuals eligible for medical assistance have 
reasonable access," whereas Section 30(A) requires equal access -- rates 
must be "sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services 
are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and 
services are available to the general population in the geographic area." 
Fortunately, Wilder avoided the problem of distinguishing those 
mandatory payment floors that are intended to benefit the payee from 
those that are not. While how high the statute sets the payment floor will 
determine the magnitude of the intended benefit (a low minimum 
reimbursement rate obviously does not benefit providers as much as a 
high minimum reimbursement rate), under Wilder  as long as the statute 
expressly requires states to pay providers, providers are intended 
beneficiaries. 
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U.S.C. S 609, which authorizes the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services to penalize a 
state if it is not in "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D. 
Id. at 335. 
 
The Blessing Court held that S 609(a)(8) does not create 
an individual right, enforceable under S 1983, to have 
states achieve substantial compliance with Title IV-D. First, 
the Court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to identify a 
particular provision of Title IV-D that grants them an 
individual entitlement, and may not simply sue to enforce 
substantial compliance with Title IV-D as a whole. See 
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342 ("It was incumbent upon 
respondents to identify with particularity the rights they 
claimed, since it is impossible to determine whether Title 
IV-D, as an undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined 
`rights.' "). Second, the Court reasoned that because 
S 609(a)(8)'s "substantial compliance" requirement would be 
satisfied if the state provided the mandated services in only 
75% of the cases reviewed during the federal audit period, 
"even when a State is in `substantial compliance' with Title 
IV-D, any individual plaintiff might still be among the 10 or 
25 percent of persons whose needs ultimately go unmet." 
Id. at 344. Thus, "[f]ar from creating an individual 
entitlement to services, the standard [which plaintiffs seek 
to enforce under S 1983] is simply a yardstick for the 
Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of a 
State's Title IV-D program." Id. at 343. 
 
In view of the Supreme Court's rationale in Blessing, 
plaintiffs' claims in this case are easily distinguishable from 
plaintiffs' claims in Blessing. First, unlike the plaintiffs in 
Blessing, the plaintiffs in this case have identified with 
particularity the right claimed, since they allege that the 
reimbursement rates violate Section 30(A)'s quality of care 
and adequate access mandates. Cf. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 
342 (distinguishing Wilder on the ground that "in Wilder, 
we held that health care providers had an enforceable right 
to reimbursement . . . as required by a particular provision 
in the Medicaid statute") (emphasis added). This case is 
therefore distinguishable from Blessing for the same reason 
that the Blessing Court concluded that Wilder was 
distinguishable from Blessing. 
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Blessing is further distinguishable on the ground that in 
that case, the plaintiffs would not necessarily have obtained 
any benefit had they succeeded on the merits of their claim, 
since the provision that they sought to enforce under 
S 1983 required only "substantial compliance" with Title IV- 
D. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 344 ("[E]ven when a State is in 
`substantial compliance' with Title IV-D, any individual 
plaintiff might still be among the 10 or 25 percent of 
persons whose needs ultimately go unmet."). By contrast, 
in this case each individual plaintiff will necessarily benefit 
if they succeed on the merits, since they would each be 
individually entitled to reimbursement at higher rates. 
 
I therefore disagree with Evergreen's reliance on Blessing 
in concluding that Section 30(A) creates only a system-wide 
guarantee, not an individual entitlement on the part of 
providers. The Fifth Circuit in Evergreen illustrated its 
reasoning with the following example: 
 
       Assume we have a nursing home in Baton Rouge with 
       150 residents, which, following the [rate reduction at 
       issue], is forced into bankruptcy and then liquidation. 
       Assume further that the district court decides that the 
       relevant geographic market to measure the access of 
       recipients is the Baton Rouge market for nursing home 
       care and also that the district court concludes that the 
       recipients are entitled to the same access to nursing 
       home care in Baton Rouge as that of non-Medicaid 
       recipients. Finally, assume that, once the nursing 
       home closes, all 150 residents are able to fill vacant 
       beds in other facilities in Baton Rouge. Under this 
       scenario, there is no violation of the recipients' equal 
       access rights, despite the fact that the bankrupt 
       nursing home was put out of business. 
 
        From this example, it is apparent that while 
       recipients have an individual entitlement to equal 
       access to medical care, any benefit to healthcare 
       providers is indirect at best. The statute does not 
       confer any direct right upon the individual provider 
       because, as the above example illustrates, even if an 
       individual provider is forced to liquidate, the recipients' 
       right to access is not necessarily violated. 
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235 F.3d at 929. I find this reasoning unpersuasive. 
 
First, the Fifth Circuit put the rabbit in the hat when it 
reasoned from a hypothetical example in which Section 
30(A) is not violated. See Evergreen, 235 F.3d at 929 
("Under this scenario, there is no violation of the recipients' 
equal access rights . . . ."). Of course providers will have no 
individual entitlement under Section 30(A) to increased 
reimbursement rates under a factual scenario in which 
Section 30(A) is not violated. But in a factual scenario 
where reimbursement rates are so low that Section 30(A)'s 
adequate access guarantee is violated, every provider who 
participates in Medicaid would be individually entitled to 
reimbursement at the higher rate mandated by Section 
30(A). 
 
Second, Evergreen incorrectly assumed that unless a 
statute requiring providers to be reimbursed at a given rate 
ensures that no providers will ever be put out of business, 
the statute does not create any direct right on the part of 
providers. See Evergreen, 235 F.3d at 929 ("The statute 
does not confer any direct right upon the individual 
provider because, as the above example illustrates, even if 
an individual provider is forced to liquidate, the recipients' 
right to access is not necessarily violated."). Under any 
statute addressed to provider reimbursement, however, it 
will almost always be the case that some providers may go 
out of business notwithstanding the statute. But this 
possibility does not mean that the statute creates no 
individual entitlement on the part of providers. 
 
Consider, for example, a statute that expressly requires 
states to reimburse pharmacies at least $25 each time they 
dispense a given dosage of a particular prescription drug to 
a Medicaid recipient. A $25 reimbursement rate might force 
certain providers out of business, but it is hard to imagine 
a statute that more directly confers an individual 
entitlement on providers. Similarly, there was no guarantee 
in the Boren Amendment that no provider would ever be 
put out of business, but the Court in Wilder nonetheless 
held that the Boren Amendment conferred on providers 
rights that are enforceable under S 1983. 
 
Finally, the Evergreen Court mistakenly reasoned that 
because the minimum reimbursement rate mandated by 
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Section 30(A) is defined by reference to the market-wide 
criterion of Medicaid recipients' access to healthcare, it 
does not confer an individual entitlement on providers. See 
Evergreen, 235 F.3d at 928 ("Section 30(A) does not create 
an individual entitlement in favor of any provider. The 
section benefits recipients by ensuring there is an adequate 
number of providers in the market place."). That Section 
30(A) defines the mandatory minimum provider 
reimbursement rate by reference to the number of providers 
in the market place, however, does not make the rate any 
less mandatory or any less of a minimum. As long as a 
statute expressly requires providers to be reimbursed at 
rates that are at least equal to a defined minimum, then 
the statute creates an individual entitlement on the part of 
every provider to be reimbursed at that minimum, 
regardless whether the minimum is defined by reference to 
providers' costs, recipients' access, quality of care, market 
rates, or a fixed sum. 
 
Thus, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that "it 
cannot be said that section 30(A) necessarily confers upon 
each provider an individual right to a particular payment," 
Section 30(A) clearly does confer upon each provider an 
individual right to be paid at rates that are at least equal to 
the statutory minimum.  See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510 
("There can be little doubt that health care providers are 
the intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment. The 
provision establishes a system for reimbursement of 
providers and is phrased in terms benefitting health care 
providers: It requires a state plan to provide for `payment of 
the hospital services, nursing facility services, and services 
in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded 
provided under the plan.' ") (internal alterations omitted). 
Cf. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 21 (3d 
Cir. 1989), aff 'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) 
("Who else is more aggrieved by the absence of an adequate 
or reasonable hospital reimbursement rate than a 
disadvantaged hospital and who has a more compelling 
interest to press for a correction?"). 
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V. 
 
Finally, although one can find isolated instances of 
Medicaid recipients suing to enforce Section 30(A), see, e.g., 
Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 
908, 931-32 (5th Cir. 2000); Ark. Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1993), I do not share 
the majority's optimism that lawsuits brought by Medicaid 
recipients will provide sufficient private enforcement. See 
Maj. Op. at 21-22 ("If, as the plaintiffs in this case allege, 
the rates set under the HealthChoices program are so low 
that compliance with the `quality of care' and access 
requirements is threatened, we see no reason to believe 
that recipients in the affected area of the Commonwealth 
will not seek legal redress to ensure that these critical 
mandates are met."). Medicaid recipients are, by definition, 
people facing severe financial hardship, and therefore are 
unlikely to have the same access to legal services as 
healthcare providers.5 
 
Moreover, Section 30(A), by its express terms, uses 
provider reimbursement rates as the means of ensuring 
recipients' quality of care and adequate access, and 
healthcare providers are more likely than Medicaid 
recipients to possess information about the relationship 
between current provider reimbursement rates and 
recipients' quality of care and access to care and services. 
Indeed, few if any Medicaid recipients will even be aware of 
current provider reimbursement rates, much less have an 
idea of how a particular rate compares with provider costs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. To be sure, attorney's fees are available to a successful S 1983 
plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. S 1988 ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a 
provision of section[ ] . . . 1983 . . . of this title, . . . the court, 
in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's 
fee 
as part of the costs . . . ."). Awards of attorney's fees may be 
inadequate 
to induce attorneys to represent Medicaid recipients in Section 30(A) 
cases, however, since such attorneys would assume the risk of earning 
no fees if the lawsuit is unsuccessful. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 
505 U.S. 557 (1992) (holding that in determining the reasonableness of 
attorney's fees under federal fee shifting statutes, courts may not 
enhance the fee award above the "lodestar" amount to compensate 
attorneys for assuming the risk of receiving no payment for their services 
if the lawsuit failed). 
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and the reimbursement rates offered by non-Medicaid 
healthcare plans. Nor are Medicaid recipients likely to have 
ready access to statistical information on the extent to 
which healthcare is available to the general public, for 
purposes of determining whether current reimbursement 
rates comply with Section 30(A)'s adequate access mandate. 
By contrast, professional associations such as the 
pharmacists association plaintiff in this case are more 
likely to possess the market data necessary to determine 
whether a colorable claim under Section 30(A) exists. 
 
In sum, because Section 30(A) is expressly addressed to 
the financial incentives of healthcare providers to 
participate in Medicaid, healthcare providers are well- 
situated to vindicate recipients' and providers' shared 
interest in ensuring that provider reimbursement rates are 
consistent with quality of care and sufficient to guarantee 
Medicaid recipients access to care and services to the same 
extent as the general public. These practical considerations 
further support the result compelled by Wilder . 
 
VI. 
 
Because I believe that the question whether providers 
may bring S 1983 actions to enforce Section 30(A) is 
squarely controlled by Wilder, I would decline to follow 
Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 
908 (5th Cir. 2000), and would join those Circuits that, 
relying on Wilder, have permitted providers to bring such 
claims. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 
93 F.3d 997, 1005 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[W]e conclude that 
plaintiffs possess standing . . . to enforce section 
1396a(a)(30) . . . ."); Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 
F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996) ("We therefore . . . hold 
that providers of medical care have a private right of action, 
derived through S 1983, to enforce S 1396a(a)(30)."); Ark. 
Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 528 (8th Cir. 
1993) ("[T]he equal access provision [of Section 30(A)] may 
be enforced by Medicaid recipients and providers using 42 
U.S.C. S 1983."). I thus respectfully dissent. 
 
To hold as have these other Courts would not of course 
be the end of the case, for the plaintiffs would still have 
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significant hurdles in the next phase. In particular, 
plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that they have 
produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find 
that the current reimbursement rates are so low that they 
violate either the quality of care or adequate access 
mandate contained in Section 30(A), a question on which I 
express no opinion here. Since the Court has not gone 
beyond the threshold issue of whether S 1983 grants 
providers a right of action to enforce Section 30(A), I would 
reconstitute the original panel so that it may resolve the 
merits of the Department's summary judgment motion, 
which requires determining whether plaintiffs have 
produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find 
that the challenged reimbursement rates violate Section 
30(A)'s quality of care and adequate access mandates. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom Chief 
Judge BECKER joins: 
 
I join in Chief Judge Becker's thoughtful dissenting 
opinion and write separately only to offer a permissible 
reading of the statutory language different from that urged 
by the majority. The majority terms the language"complex" 
and "breaks it down." However, I see it as fairly straight- 
forward -- at least regarding what we need to decide -- 
when properly parsed. If we were to "parse" the statute at 
issue in grammarian fashion, we would note that the"state 
plan" is the noun, "must provide," the verb, and "methods 
and procedures," the object. Then comes the descriptive 
phrase "relating to the utilization of, and payment for, care 
and services available under the plan." The methods and 
procedures must relate to the use of care and services -- by 
individual recipients -- and the payment-- to providers -- 
for care and services. 
 
What then follows in the statute -- preceded by"as may 
be necessary . . ." -- is no more than a further descriptive 
phrase setting forth the barometer or standard against 
which the utilization and payment methods and procedures 
are to be measured. Why should only the users  be able to 
challenge a plan that must pass muster not only in terms 
of the methods and procedures for "utilization," but also the 
methods and procedures for "payment?" 
 
I think it eminently reasonable to conclude that both 
aspects -- use and payment -- are foci, and that both 
constituencies can speak to whether the statutory 
requirement ("as may be necessary to . . .") has been 
fulfilled, and both should have the right to complain that in 
fact it has not. 
 
Also, in response to the majority's footnote 15, I submit 
that I am not ignoring the second part of the provision, and 
I do not view the provision as hopelessly vague. Rather, I 
see no need to mention it because it sets forth a standard 
that is quite susceptible to proof. I have little difficulty 
imagining the gist of the testimony of recipients, providers, 
and state administrators as to how the procedures in place 
impact the sufficiency of payment and quality of service, so 
that judicial decision making can be exercised. I do, 
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however, continue to have difficulty in understanding why 
there cannot be two intended beneficiaries, especially if the 
statute is designed to benefit one (the providers) in order to 
provide the desired level of services to the other (the 
recipients). 
 
Further, I suggest that the fact that the language post- 
repeal of Boren continues to reference "rates" is actually 
quite insignificant. In repealing Boren, Congress replaced 
the standard for the rates ("reasonable and adequate") with 
the requirement that the state provide for a public process 
for determination of rates. What is significant, however, is 
the fact that the Boren Amendment language that had been 
held to afford a cause of action required that rates be 
"reasonable and adequate," and the language we are 
quibbling over similarly describes a standard for payments 
to providers. I see no meaningful distinction between the 
two and therefore respectfully dissent. 
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